Chapman Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 2

Article 13

2010

Digest: Vargas v. City of Salinas
Paul A. Alarcon

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
Recommended Citation
Paul A. Alarcon, Digest: Vargas v. City of Salinas, 13 Chap. L. Rev. 467 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol13/iss2/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.

Do Not Delete

5/10/2010 12:30 PM

Digest: Vargas v. City of Salinas
Paul A. Alarcón
Opinion by George, C.J., with Kennard, J., Baxter, J.,
Werdegar, J., Chin, J., Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J. Concurring
Opinion by Moreno, J., with Werdegar, J.
Issues
(1) Whether the protections of a motion-to-strike provided in
California’s anti-SLAPP (“Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation”) statute are available to a public entity or its
officials.
(2) Whether the Court of Appeal for the Sixth District
correctly concluded that the “express advocacy” standard from
section 54964 of the California Civil Code, rather than the
standard laid out in Stanson v. Mott, controlled the distinction
between activities which presumptively may and those which
presumptively may not be paid for by public funds.
(3) Whether, under the correct standard, the trial court’s
decision to grant the City of Salinas’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike
was proper.
Facts
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Angelina Morfin Vargas and Mark
Dierolf, were the proponents of a local tax-relief initiative,
ultimately termed Measure O, which qualified for the November
2002 ballot in the City of Salinas.1 Measure O was designed to
reduce and finally repeal the City’s utility user tax which
generated a substantial percentage of the city’s general fund
budget.2 Once qualified, the Salinas City Council was required to
either adopt the substance of the proposed initiative as an
ordinance, submit the initiative to the voters, or direct the
municipality’s staff to prepare a report on the impact of the
proposed initiative should it become law.3 The city council
elected to have a report prepared and, once the report was
completed, decided not to adopt the initiative as an ordinance but
1
2
3

Vargas v. City of Salinas, 205 P.3d 207, 209 (Cal. 2009).
Id. at 210–11.
Id. at 211 (citing CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9212, 9215 (West 2003)).
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rather to send it to the voters.4 Thereafter, the city council
adopted recommendations from the city staff regarding the city
services and programs that would be reduced or eliminated
should Measure O pass.5
Subsequently, the City of Salinas posted the minutes of each
city council meeting on the city’s website, according to its regular
practice, as well as the city’s report on the potential impact of
Measure O, slideshows relating to Measure O from different city
departments, and a report by the city responding to the
alternative reductions suggested by the proponents of Measure
O.6 Further, the city produced a one-page document describing
Measure O, the utility user tax, and the services which would be
reduced or eliminated.7 This document was made available to
the public in all city libraries, city hall, and the city website.
Finally, articles in the city newsletter regularly discussed the
utility user tax, Measure O, and its effect on city services.8
Plaintiffs filed suit and accused Defendants, the City of
Salinas and its manager Dave Mora, of engaging in unlawful
campaign activities by using public funds “to prepare and
distribute pamphlets, newsletters and Web site materials.”9
Defendants filed a motion to strike pursuant to California’s antiSLAPP statute.10 The trial court granted this motion and
Plaintiffs appealed.11 The court of appeal found, in accordance
with a lengthy heritage of courts of appeal decisions, that the
anti-SLAPP statute’s protections apply to public entities and, in
the instant case, that Defendants had established the first prong
of the anti-SLAPP statute—that Defendants’ statements and
actions concerned a matter of public interest.12 Further, the
court of appeal found that Plaintiffs were unable to satisfy their
burden of making a prima facie showing that they would likely
succeed on the merits of the action since Defendants’ statements
and actions were not unlawful under the “express advocacy”
standard provided in section 54964 of the California Civil Code.13
The court of appeal rejected the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the

Id.
Id. at 211–12.
6 Id. at 212.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 212–13.
9 Id. at 213.
10 Id. at 213–14.
11 Id. at 214.
12 Vargas v. City of Salinas, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 514–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(review granted and opinion superseded), aff’d, 205 P.3d 207 (Cal. 2009).
13 Id. at 520–526.
4
5
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standard articulated in Stanson, rather than section 54964,
should control.14 Upon further appeal, the California Supreme
Court granted Plaintiffs’ petition of review.15
Analysis
As a preliminary matter, the California Supreme Court
found that the protections of California’s anti-SLAPP statute
extend to public entities.16 The court noted that it need not
decide whether or not “the First Amendment of the federal
Constitution or article I, section 2 of the California Constitution
directly protects government speech” either in general or of the
types involved in the instant case.17
The court considered the anti-SLAPP statute, its legislative
history, and a related statute.18 First, subdivision (e) of the antiSLAPP statute, which defines an “act” deserving of anti-SLAPP
protection, is phrased in broad terms and does not distinguish
between private entities or individuals and public ones.19
Further, the California Legislature stated that the anti-SLAPP
statute was to be “construed broadly” and the legislative history
of the provision revealed legislative concern that abusive
lawsuits may discourage statements by public officials regarding
public issues.20 Finally, California’s SLAPPback statute, enacted
after the numerous courts of appeal decisions which found the
anti-SLAPP statute to apply to public entities, expressly permits
a public entity to bring an “action for malicious prosecution or
abuse of process arising from the filing or maintenance of a prior
cause of action that has been dismissed pursuant to a special
This statutory authorization to bring
motion to strike.”21
SLAPPback actions would be meaningless and incomprehensible
if public entities were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.22
The court also summarily concluded that Defendant’s statements
constituted “protected activity” within the meaning of the antiSLAPP statute because they concerned a matter of public
interest and, therefore, that prong one of the anti-SLAPP test
had been satisfied.23

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 523–25.
Vargas, 205 P.3d at 215.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 216–17.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 217.
Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.18(b)(1) (West 2003)).
Id.
Id.

Do Not Delete

470

5/10/2010 12:30 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 13:467

1.

The Proper Legal Standard for Determining Whether
Actions Relating to Elections and Ballot Measures May
be Paid for by Public Funds
The court compared two possible legal standards for whether
the statements or actions of a public entity or its officers may or
may not be paid for by public funds or utilize public resources.24
The court of appeal accepted the bright-line “express advocacy”
standard adopted by section 54964 of the California Civil Code
because the appellate court believed that this statute rendered
Stanson inapplicable since Stanson expressly limited itself to
cases not involving clear and unmistakable language authorizing
expenditure of public funds for campaign purposes.25 In Stanson,
the California? Supreme Court articulated a standard which
distinguished between public fund spending for “campaign
purposes,” which was not allowed, and for “informational
purposes,” which was permitted.26 In that opinion, the court also
stated that “no hard and fast rule governs every case” and that,
in certain cases, courts would have to make the determination
based “upon a careful consideration of such factors as the style,
tenor and timing of the publication.”27
The court concluded that the court of appeal had erred in
applying the “express advocacy” standard.28 Section 54964 does
not “affirmatively authorize” the use of public funds for
communications which do not expressly advocate the approval or
rejection of a ballot measure.29 Rather, the section “simply
prohibits a municipality’s use of public funds for communications
that expressly advocate such a position.”30 Further, the court
concluded that the legislative history of section 54964 did not
support the conclusion that the legislature intended to overturn
Stanson—the committee report explicitly mentioned Stanson but
in no way indicated an intent to “depart from or modify” that
decision.31 Finally, utilizing the “express advocacy” standard in
cases like the instant one raises troubling constitutional
concerns.32 The court noted that “[i]f a public entity could expend
public funds for any type of election-related communication so
long as the communication avoided ‘express words of advocacy’
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 220–28.
Vargas, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 523–25.
Vargas, 205 P.3d at 221 (quoting Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1976)).
Id. (quoting Stanson, 551 P.2d at 12) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 228.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id. at 225–26.
Id. at 226.
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and did not ‘unambiguously urge[ ] a particular result’” then “the
public entity easily could overwhelm the voters by using the
public treasury to finance . . . campaign material containing
messages that, while eschewing the use of express advocacy,
nonetheless as a realistic matter effectively promote one side of
Thus, because no statute clearly and
an election.”33
unmistakably authorized Defendants to use public funds for
campaign activities, the standard elucidated in Stanson applies
to the instant case.34
2. Whether the Conduct of the City of Salinas and the City
Manager Violated the Standard Articulated in Stanson
Since no statute clearly and unambiguously authorized
Defendants to use public funds for campaign activities, the court
turned to the question of “whether the activities fall within the
category of informational activities that may be funded through
such general appropriations or, instead, constitute campaign
activities that may not be paid for by public funds in the absence
of such explicit authorization.”35 The court noted that neither the
material posted on the website, the one-page document, or the
newsletters clearly fell within the categories which Stanson
recognized as presumptively improper—”bumper stickers,
posters, advertising ‘floats,’ or television and radio ‘spots’ . . . [or]
the dissemination, at public expense, of campaign literature
prepared by private proponents or opponents of a ballot
measure”—but the court declared this list not to be exhaustive.36
The court rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the “style,
tenor, and timing” of the challenged communications violated the
Stanson rule because they impermissibly took sides in the
election contest.37 The court interpreted Stanson as banning a
public entity from “taking sides” in election contests by using
“the public treasury to mount an election campaign.”38 In the
instant case, Defendants’ activities were not impermissible to the
extent they merely “evaluate[d] the merits of [the] proposed
ballot measure and [made their] views known to the public.”39

Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 228. The court noted that, since section 54964 does not clearly and
unmistakably authorize Defendants to use public funds for campaigning activities, the
court did not need to address the serious constitutional question which such an explicit
legislative authorization would pose. Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. (alteration in original).
37 Id. at 228–29.
38 Id. at 229 (quoting Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 9–10 (Cal. 1976)).
39 Id.
Indeed, the court noted that merely by refusing to adopt the proposed
33
34
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The court found that merely posting the reports and minutes
of council meetings on the website, so as to make them available
to the public, constituted permissible informative, rather than
campaign, activity.40 Similarly, the one-page document made
available in the city hall and libraries was not impermissible
advocacy since the document did not “recommend how the
electorate should vote on the ballot measure” and because its
“style and tenor is not at all comparable to traditional campaign
Rather, “from the perspective of an objective
material.”41
observer, the document clearly is an informational statement
that merely advises the public of the specific plans that the city
council voted to implement, should Measure O be adopted.”42
The court also found relevant the fact that the document was
“simply made . . . available at the city clerk’s office and in public
libraries to members of the public who sought out the
document.”43
Finally, the court concluded that “the City did not engage in
impermissible campaign activity by mailing to city residents” the
newsletter containing articles about Measure O.44 The court
cautioned that in some cases mass mailings of material relating
to ballot measures right before an election could constitute
However, the court found
improper campaign activity.45
significant the fact that the newsletter was “a regular edition”
rather than a special edition mailed to a larger number of
citizens than usual.46 Additionally, the “the style and tenor of
the publication in question was entirely consistent with an
ordinary municipal newsletter and readily distinguishable from
Thus, the articles were
traditional campaign material.”47
“moderate in tone and did not exhort voters with regard to how
they should vote” and provided information “in an objective and
nonpartisan manner.”48
The court highlighted certain factors which contributed to its
conclusion that Defendants’ actions were merely informational
and not campaign activities.
First, the information

ordinance and instead sending it to the voters, the city council could not help but reveal
their view that the measure should fail. Id.
40 Id. at 230.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 231.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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communicated was primarily factual.49 Second, the statements
“avoided argumentative or inflammatory rhetoric.”50 Third, the
information was conveyed in a manner “consistent with
established practice regarding use of the Web site and regular
circulation of the city’s official newsletter.”51 Therefore, the court
concluded that the court of appeal was correct to decide that
Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden under prong two of the
anti-SLAPP statute.52 Thus, the court affirmed the decision of
the court of appeal.53
Holding
The court held that “a lawsuit against a public entity that
arises from its statements or actions is potentially subject to the
anti-SLAPP
statute”
and
that
“the
campaign
activity/informational material dichotomy set forth in Stanson
remains the appropriate standard for distinguishing the type of
activities that presumptively may not be paid for by public funds,
from those activities that presumptively may be financed from
public funds.”54 However, the court concluded that, in the
instant case, “the appellate court reached the correct result in
upholding the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to
strike.”55
Concurrence
Justice Moreno agreed that the “express advocacy” standard
was insufficient and that Defendants’ actions were not
unlawful.56 However, in light of Proposition 13 passed by voters
in 1978, he questioned whether the “concept of prohibited
‘campaign activity’ set forth in Stanson, and reaffirmed by the
majority meets the current needs of governance.”57 Proposition
13 removed the power to raise local revenues from local
legislatures to the electorate.58 “In this context, local and
regional agencies sometimes have been specially charged with
the task of sponsoring ballot propositions to raise revenue to fund
various infrastructure improvements and services that are

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 217, 228 (citation omitted).
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id. at 234.
Id.

Do Not Delete

474

5/10/2010 12:30 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 13:467

deemed necessary.”59
Hence, difficulties might arise from
attempting to reconcile “the funding of an active informational
campaign to promote or defend a lawfully government-sponsored
ballot measure” with the majority’s “informational/campaign
activity dichotomy.”60 Of course, as the majority and Stanson
recognized, the legislature may expressly authorize “a public
entity to expend public funds for campaign activities or
materials” by clearly and unmistakably granting this
permission.61
Legal Significance
In Vargas, the California Supreme Court has finally
expressly held that California’s anti-SLAPP statute applies to
public entities and their officers or employees. Further, the court
has reaffirmed the rule and standard enunciated in Stanson that
public entities may not use public resources to support campaign
activities but may use such funds to provide the public with
impartial information.
In rejecting the “express advocacy”
standard, the court rejected the position that merely avoiding
communications for or against a particular ballot measure would
protect a public entity or its officers from lawsuits. Additionally,
while Stanson provided clear examples of what types of activities
constitute “advocacy” and what are “informational,” the instant
case provides factors to which courts may look for guidance in
cases involving activities which do not neatly fit into the
campaign/informational dichotomy. These factors suggest that a
public entity which avoids communications that are
substantively campaign-like and does not involve procedurally
irregular expenses or communications is likely to prevail in a
subsequent prosecution. However, the Vargas court’s conclusion
that the “government may not take sides” rule, expressed in
Stanson, only applies where the public funds are used “to mount
an election campaign” leaves open the possibility that the court is
actually relaxing the standard articulated in Stanson. Future
decisions may be required for clarity. Finally, whether the
California Legislature may constitutionally authorize the use of
public funds for campaigning remains unresolved.

Id.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 235–36. “Of course, any such legislation would have to conform to
constitutional constraints so as to preserve ‘the integrity of the electoral process.’” Id. at
236.
59
60
61

